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This paper exploits the fact that the variability in the inter-spike intervals, in 
the spike train issuing from a neuron, carries substantial information 
regarding the input to the neuron. A framework for neuronal information 
processing is proposed which utilizes the above fact to distinguish 
phenomenal from non-phenomenal mental representation. In the process, an 
explanation is offered as to what it is, in the nature of conscious mental 
states, that imparts them a subjective feeling – there is something it is like to 
be in those mental states. To give empirical support, it is shown how the 
proposed framework can neatly explain, the delay in eliciting conscious 
awareness as observed by Libet and the related backwards referral in time. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Phenomenal experience is our first person view of the surrounding world and it is private. If 
you are sipping a cup of coffee, you can ask yourself – what is it like (for you) to taste the 
coffee, to smell its distinct aroma, to hold the cup and feel its shape and, feel the warmth of 
the coffee inside. It is a basic assumption that you will get some sort of answers to these 
questions if you are in a conscious state. You will have difficulties in expressing your 
feelings clearly, but you will not deny those feelings. There is something it is like to be you 
at any point of time when you are conscious. To paraphrase Nagel [1974], the essence of the 
belief that any organism, bats for example, is conscious is that there is something it is like to 
be that organism - there is something it is like to be a bat. This is probably the closest we 
can come to a definition of consciousness or phenomenal consciousness as Block [1995] 
would like to distinguish it. 
 
We are also intentional beings; our mental states represent the world surrounding us. During 
the course of our everyday life we generate mental states with contents such as beliefs, 
desires, perceptions etc. All such mental states are about or refer to things in our 
environment. A perceptual state can refer to, or have as its content, a red apple and one may 
be entertaining a belief about snakes, that they are all poisonous. Such representations are 
ubiquitous, however theories of representation insist that the contents of these intentional 
states be evaluable for consistency and truth with respect to the states of the world i.e, 
beliefs as true or false, memories as accurate or inaccurate, perceptions as veridical or 
illusory – e.g. the belief that all snakes are poisonous is false.  
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These two central aspects of mind, phenomenal and intentional, have given rise to the 
representationalist thesis of consciousness, which claims that phenomenal properties are 
representational in character, hence if mental representation is well understood then so 
would be the nature of phenomenal experience. A question that arises immediately is this; 
are mental representations all there is to phenomenal experience? Philosophers are divided 
on this issue. Reductive representationalists whose main proponents are Dretske [1995] and 
Tye [1995] among others, would answer to the above question in the affirmative. Non-
reductive representationalists [Chalmers 2004, see Pitt 2005 for a review] hold a more 
moderate view; according to them not all phenomenal properties of a mental state can be 
reduced to representational properties. The main difficulty confronting the reductive agenda 
is to provide an account that distinguishes between conscious and unconscious experience. 
Reductive representationalists endeavour to do this by appealing to the notion of 
functionality. For example Tye [1995] casts his thesis along the lines of PANIC: for Poised, 
Abstract, Non-conceptual, Intentional Content. Phenomenal representations according to 
him are poised to have appropriate behavioural impact. This stipulated functionality is then 
exploited to rule out non-phenomenal representations. This is rather problematic as 
Carruthers [2000, Chapter 6] points out; it is possible to instantiate functional properties 
without any associated phenomenology. In other words, there are mental states with 
representational contents which guide behaviour, but as far as the subject is concerned there 
is nothing 'it is like to be in these states'2. Moreover an important fact that remains 
unexplained is this: how can the mere availability of a mental state towards some functional 
role impart that state a subjective feeling that there is something it is like to be in that state.  
 
In this paper I propose a manner of representation that can distinguish phenomenal from 
non-phenomenal representations without appealing to functionalism. I show that it is 
possible to differentiate between phenomenal and non-phenomenal representations by 
detecting the differences in the intrinsic nature of these representations - by understanding 
how these representations were created in the first place or in other words by gaining an 
insight into the nature of information processing that went into the creation of such 
representations. In the process I will provide a plausible explanation as to what is it in the 
nature some representations that imparts them a subjective feeling – there is something it is 
like to be in those mental states. Let me start by explicating some aspects of the information 
processing conducted by the central nervous system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Furthermore an appeal to functionalism to characterise mental states is flawed at a more fundamental level 
according to O'Brien and Opie [2004]. They argue that " … a theory (of mental representation) must explain 
mental representation in a fashion consistent with its causal role in shaping appropriate behaviour…. We shall 
call this the causal constraint on a theory of mental representation.  
Remarkably, even though the well-known causal, functional, and teleosemantic theories of mental 
representation are all naturalistic, they all violate the causal constraint. Despite their internal differences, these 
theories ultimately treat mental content in terms of the appropriate behaviour that cognitive subjects are 
capable of exhibiting towards their environments. And any theory that treats mental content in terms of 
intelligent behaviour is in principle unable to explain how mental representation is causally responsible for 
such behaviour. A thing cannot cause what it is constituted by." 
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2. Hierarchies in neural information processing 
 
2.1 Hierarchies and feature detectors 
 
The main function of the sensory cortex, as Koch [2004, pp22-23] points out, "is to 
construct and use highly specific feature detectors, such as those for orientation, motion or 
faces". To this purpose the sensory cortex is arranged in a semi-hierarchical manner. Let us 
concentrate on the anatomical hierarchy of the visual system, which is better understood. 
The retinal ganglion cells in the retina receive the visual input from the environment and 
respond simply to whatever contrast is present at that point in space. Feed forward 
connections from the retina carry the stimulus to the low level cortical areas V1 and V2, 
where the signals are integrated to represent simple features such as lines or edges of 
specific orientation and location. From there on the visual signals propagate to higher 
cortical areas through further neural projections. At the next higher levels V3, V4 and 
medial-temporal area MT, signals are further integrated over their spatial parameters to 
represent more global features. Still higher levels, inferotemporal area IT, prefrontal area 
PF, etc., implement further integration of the visual signal to represent abstract forms, 
objects and categories [Hochstein and Ahissar 2002]. 
 
To see things clearly let us build a simple picture as follows. Let us say a population of 
neurons W constitutes the projective field of a population V which in turn is the projective 
field of a set of neurons U. Stimulating U will stimulate V which in turn will stimulate W; or 
U, V, W specify an ascending hierarchy of neural groups. Neurons in V receive inputs from 
neurons in U and integrate them in some linear or non-linear fashion. Let us say a subset ∆ 
of V neurons, is primed to detect a particular significant correlation in the input from the U 
neurons, i.e. ∆ can detect some feature implicit in the activities of the U neurons. Thus the 
activities of neurons in this subset ∆ express this feature explicitly. Different subsets in V 
would serve as different feature detectors and any such subset will modify its properties, 
predominantly synapses, to become a better detector of the feature it detects. Neurons in W 
detect correlations in the activities of the neurons in V. Hence the features detected by the W 
neurons are more complex as they express correlations in the features already detected by 
the V neurons. I was careful to call the above a simple picture because things are rather more 
involved; one often finds feedback connections from zones higher in the hierarchy to lower 
ones and connections among zones at about the same level abound. Neuroscientists to a 
large extent, agree that as a rule (with exceptions), feedforward connections are stronger and 
drive the stimuli up along the hierarchy while feedback connections only serve to modify 
the propagation of the stimuli [Koch 2004 pp 126-127]. 
 
Thus the classical receptive fields of neurons higher in the (visual) hierarchy are larger and 
correspond to more complex features than those that are lower down [Crick and Koch 
2003]. What is more, as one ascends up along the hierarchy, not only do neurons become 
increasingly selective for more and more complex features, but also the code becomes 
increasingly sparse. In other words up along the hierarchy fewer and fewer neurons get 
activated by a given stimulus. Sparse coding, according to Olhausen and Field [2004], 
confers several advantages – among others, it makes the structure in natural signals explicit, 
and it represents complex data in a way that is easier to read out at subsequent levels of 
processing. 
 
The ability to detect specific features enables a subject to react to his or her environment 
rapidly and accurately. For example there are nearly 200 million photoreceptors in the eyes 
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collecting visual information. This sea of data would be a hindrance to a subject facing a 
threat from the environment. What the subject needs is to extract the specific features that 
represent the threat, from the impinging data, and react to it aptly. This is what feature 
extraction in terms of sparse coding does; it makes the threatening features explicit in a way 
that makes it easier for subsequent levels of processing to assess and react to the threat 
appropriately. In the process a lot of data that are irrelevant to the perception of the threat 
are suppressed or made unavailable to the process of threat assessment. 
 
 
2.2 Hierarchies and conscious perception 
 
Representations at higher levels are less particular about spatial features such as precise 
location, viewpoint, lighting and colour, instead neural processing at higher levels produce 
representations that are comparatively more global and abstract. In other words neural 
activities at higher levels generalize over space, size, viewpoint etc. and thereby capture the 
presence of basic categories or object types but not their precise parameters. Hence what is 
represented at higher levels of the visual path is a gist of the scene with blindness to the 
details [Hochstein and Ahissar 2002]. 
 
How does the above picture help explain conscious perception? Crick and Koch [2003] 
argue that, given a visual input, the neural activity first travels rapidly and unconsciously up 
the visual hierarchy to a high level where a gist of the scene is produced. Neural activities 
then start moving backwards down the hierarchy producing conscious perception along the 
way. The first stages to reach consciousness are therefore the higher levels followed by the 
lower levels which add details to the downwards moving conscious activation. Hochstein 
and Ahissar [2002] provide a similar explanation, with more details, which they call the 
reverse hierarchy theory. According to them: "Processing along the feedforward hierarchy 
of areas, leading to increasingly complex representations, is automatic and implicit, while 
conscious perception begins at the hierarchy’s top, gradually turning downward as needed. 
Thus, our initial conscious percept—vision at a glance—matches a high-level, generalized, 
categorical scene interpretation, identifying 'forest before trees'. For later vision with 
scrutiny, reverse hierarchy routines focus attention to specific, active, low-level units, 
incorporating into conscious perception detailed information available there. …The large 
receptive fields of high cortical areas are reflected in the spread attention of initial 
perception, while smaller low-area receptive fields are responsible for later focused 
attention."  
 
Clearly what the above authors are emphasising is focussing of attention rather than the 
feeling of phenomenal experience. Yes, if attention to details at successive levels is what 
needs explaining then a downward flowing information processing, against the hierarchies, 
is an explanation. However conscious perception is not the same as attention to details. 
What needs explanation is this – if attention is focussed on a certain level, how does the 
subject become conscious of the features extracted at that level? I propose that a subject 
consciously perceives the features extracted at a certain level when she has a sense of 
perceiving these features within the context of yet more elementary features extracted at 
lower levels without actually shifting her attention to those lower levels. To this purpose let 
me explore a particular way in which neurons could be processing information. 
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3. Conscious information processing 
 
3.1 Information coded in inter-spike intervals 
 
Neurons process information by integrating a large number of input signals and generating a 
train of discrete action potentials or spikes as output. These spikes are usually generated at 
irregular time intervals. A question that immediately arises is whether this variability in 
inter-spike intervals (ISI) carries information or reflects noisy neural mechanisms. Here I 
argue that variability in ISI does carry information; information that is vital for conscious 
perception. 
 
In vitro experiments with neural tissues suggest that neurons, when subjected to stimuli with 
transients resembling synaptic activity, can generate spikes with very fine temporal 
precision [Manien and Sejnowski 1995]. In other words when a stimulus is repeated the 
spiking pattern in the spike train is also repeated spike for spike in a highly reliable fashion. 
This finding is somewhat supported by recent in vivo experiments [see Bohte 2003 for a 
review]. For example, Reinagel and Reid [2000] show that lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) 
relay cells can be remarkably deterministic, with reliable and temporally precise responses 
controlled primarily by the visual stimulus and altered very little by noise. These findings 
suggest that neurons in their natural surrounding can be effectively modelled as 
deterministic mechanisms. Furthermore environmental stimuli, by the time it reaches higher 
cortical levels, would have undergone a series of integrative processes by such neurons 
acting deterministically. Hence, for the purpose of tractability, one can make a plausible 
assumption that the input to cortical neurons at higher levels can be modelled to have 
deterministic albeit chaotic structure. In other words the input to a cortical neuron can be 
assumed to be generated by a chaotic dynamical system – its behaviour is neither purely 
random nor perfectly predictable. 
 
The question I now pose is the following. If the input to a cortical neuron is taken to be 
generated by a chaotic dynamical system Đ, is it possible to gain knowledge about this 
dynamical system by analysing the train of spikes that issues from the neuron? Note that the 
train of spikes can be interpreted as the outcome of a series of measurements conducted by 
the neuron on Đ over time. What I am asking is this – can we utilise this series of scalar 
measurements to conduct an analysis that provides an understanding of the 
multidimensional character of the dynamical system Đ. In a seminal paper Sauer [1994] 
answered the above question in the affirmative, demonstrating in the process that the 
variability in spike generation carries information regarding the input to the neuron. Let me 
explain briefly.  
 
Let k be the state space of the dynamical system Đ. The time evolution of the dynamical 
system is completely specified by tracing the trajectory of the state point S(t), say, in the 
state space. Let us say that the trajectories of our dynamical system, from various initial 
conditions, are attracted to a d-dimensional attractor A in the state space. With Đ 
representing the input applied to the neuron, let us say we observe a train of spikes at firing 
times t0 < t1 < t2 < …, etc. From these firing times we can construct the series of inter-spike 
intervals (ISI) defined as τi = ti+1 – ti for i = 0, 1, 2 …. Using these inter spike intervals let us 
construct the set of m-tuple ISI vectors {τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}, for i = 0, 1, 2 …, etc. Each of 
these vectors marks a point in m, the set of all these points can be assigned a topology to 
form a topological space B, say, in m. Assuming that the firings of the neuron follow an 
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integrate-and-fire process, Sauer [1994] showed that under certain genericity conditions on 
the underlying dynamics of the input signal and firing threshold, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the attractor A ⊂ k and the space B ⊂m, if m > 2d. In other words 
there exists a one-to-one mapping f : B → A where f ({τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}) = S(ti) for 
i = 0, 1, 2 …; f preserves the topology though not necessarily the geometry. I will refer to B 
in m as a faithful (topologically) reconstruction of the attractor A in k.  
 
The above result has also been confirmed using a variety of neuron models, including leaky 
integrate-and-fire models and variations on the FitzHugh-Nagumo model [Racicot and 
Longtin 1997]. Furthermore, Richardson et. al. [1998] have extended this work to in vitro 
studies on rat cutaneous afferents. Their investigation shows that when such a neuron is 
driven by a chaotic system the resulting ISI series can be used to reconstruct the chaotic 
attractor for predictive purposes. 
 
As noted earlier the train of spikes can be interpreted as the outcome of a series of 
measurements conducted by the neuron on Đ; or what the neuron is essentially doing is 
recording the evolution of a property of the dynamical system Đ. This property is most 
probably a macroscopic property of Đ composed of its microscopic parameters like its 
generalised degrees of freedom. The value of this macroscopic property recorded by the 
neuron is given by τi at time ti. The dynamical system would have a number of degrees of 
freedom. Reconstructing the attractor using the series of measurements of this one property 
means that the evolutions of all the degrees of freedom of the dynamical system have been 
reconstructed. The evolution of the measured property is now embedded in the 
reconstructed evolution of the whole system. Here by 'embedded' I mean the following. Let 
h be a projection h : B →  given by h({τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}) = τi. Then as one traces the 
trajectory of Đ along the proxy attractor B the projection h traces the evolution of the 
measured property. 
 
Although it is possible to recreate the dynamics of the whole system by measuring only a 
single property of the system, much quantitative information is lost. The recreated attractor 
does not always preserve the geometry of the original attractor, only its topology is 
preserved. For example the distance between two points in the original attractor is not the 
same as the distance between the corresponding two points in the reconstructed attractor, but 
the neighbourhood of a point in the original attractor is mapped to a neighbourhood of the 
corresponding point. Hence all quantitative properties that are metric dependent are not 
preserved, but most qualitative properties are preserved. Nonetheless it is a remarkable fact 
that a faithful image of the attractor characterizing the evolution of the input dynamical 
system can be reconstructed from the spike train. This gives us great analytical powers; for 
we can analyse this proxy reconstructed attractor to draw conclusions about the topological 
and sometimes geometrical characteristics of the input dynamical system itself. I will take 
full advantage of this fact in investigating conscious information processing. 
 
In the above discussion we considered information processed by a single neuron. What 
about population coding; whereby information is processed across a population of neurons? 
Consider a population P of cortical neurons. For the sake of definiteness let us suppose that 
this population is arranged like a feed forward artificial neural network, i.e., there is a layer 
of neurons through which information is fed into P, and then there are intermediate layers 
through which the input information gets processed, and finally a layer of output neurons 
project the processed information to other parts of the cortex.  
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To facilitate later analyses, I want to look at the problem as follows. Let us say that the 
output layer of P contains n neurons. Stimuli received by P through the input layers get 
processed by the internal layers, and let us denote these processed stimuli by IP. These 
processed stimuli IP now act as input to the outer layer of n neurons, which react to this 
input by issuing a set of n spike trains. Equivalently, as indicated by previous analyses, I can 
consider the input IP to be represented by a chaotic dynamical system ĐP, upon which the n 
neurons in the output layer are conducting n sets of measurements and issuing forth n spike 
trains as a result. The characteristics of ĐP will be determined by the nature of the stimuli 
input into P, and by the connectivity, synaptic strengths and other peculiarities of the 
neurons across the internal layers in P. Can we capture the characteristics of ĐP by 
analysing the n output spike trains? 
 
It is possible to reconstruct the attractor of ĐP from the inter-spike intervals calculated for 
each of the n spike trains. There are no conceptual problems here but serious technical ones 
[Kantz and Schreiber 2003, section 9.5.2]. For our present purposes let us assume that such 
an attractor can be constructed. Again the n output neurons are essentially recording the 
evolutions of n properties of the dynamical system ĐP. These properties are functions of the 
generalised degrees of freedom of the dynamical system – or these properties are complex 
features of the dynamical system composed of simpler features like the generalised degrees 
of freedom. The dynamical system may have more than n degrees of freedom. 
Reconstructing the attractor using these n series of measurements means that the evolutions 
of all the degrees of the dynamical system have been reconstructed. The evolutions of the n 
measured properties are now embedded in the reconstructed evolution of the whole system.  
 
 
3.2 What is it like to be in a mental state? 
 
As discussed in section 2.1, when a new visual scene is presented, the elementary object and 
environmental features are detected at lower levels of visual hierarchy. As the signals 
traverse up along the hierarchy these elementary features are successively integrated to form 
more complex features. At higher levels therefore, the features extracted are increasingly 
more complex and global, culminating at levels where only a gist of the scene with 
blindness to its details is captured. 
 
Consider the situation where the subject is attending to some details in the visual scene. Let 
us say that there is a population P of neurons whose activities extract the features that the 
subject is attending to. The input to the population P of neurons contains the information 
regarding the features that are extracted at P. As this input is coming from the previous 
lower level in the hierarchy, the information it contains are in terms of features that are 
extracted at that lower level, and hence are more elementary than the features extracted at P. 
These more elementary features are processed by the internal layers of P and presented to 
the output layer as the input IP. In other words IP captures information about the sub-features 
extracted at the previous lower level which have been further processed by the internal 
layers of P. We shall say that IP represents the information regarding the sub-features 
processed at P. The features extracted at P are composed of all or some of these 
sub-features processed at P. With time, the features extracted at P, would be evolving and 
would be perceived as snapshots at discrete time intervals. The collection of these snapshots 
provides the perception of the time evolutions of these features. 
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Again as discussed in section 3.1, we can view the input IP to be represented by a possibly 
chaotic dynamical system ĐP upon which the neurons in the output layer of P are 
conducting n sets of measurements and issuing forth n spike trains as a result; where n is the 
number of neurons in the output layer of P. These n spike trains capture the evolving 
features that are being attended to and using the n spike trains it is possible to construct a 
space C, say, which is a faithful image of the attractor of ĐP. Furthermore we can consider 
the sub-features processed at P to define a set of generalised degrees of freedom of the 
dynamical system ĐP. Thus reconstructing the attractor of ĐP, is nothing but reconstructing 
the evolutions of these sub-features. These evolutions are now captured in the proxy 
attractor C. The evolutions of the features extracted at P are embedded in the evolutions of 
the sub-features processed at P, or more specifically, embedded in C.  
 
To give an example let us imagine that our subject is seated on a park bench enjoying the 
scene before her – let us say she is attending to the gist of the scene before her with 
blindness to its details. She sees people either seated or moving around, without recognising 
them, she sees trees, lawns and other prominent park features without paying attention to 
their details. These categorical features are extracted by a population of neurons high up in 
the visual hierarchy. The extraction of these high level features can be used to reconstruct 
the attractor of the input dynamical system where the evolutions of these high level features 
would be embedded in the evolutions of the comparatively more elementary sub-features. 
The question now is this – what does such a reconstruction mean. 
 
Let us say that there exists a set Π of neurons which collects the features extracted by P and 
constructs the proxy attractor C. From the discussion above it is clear that C provides a 
holistic picture of the evolution of the dynamical system ĐP in terms of the evolutions of the 
sub-features processed at P, and the evolutions of the features extracted at P are now 
embedded in C. Hence the activities of the Π neurons enable the subject to perceive the 
evolutions of the features extracted at P as embedded in the evolutions of the corresponding 
sub-features. It is this manner of perception, as I stipulate below, that provides the 
subjective feeling: there is something it is like to perceive the said features. Note that the 
subject is attending to the features extracted at P and not to the sub-features. She is not 
attending to the sub-features extracted one level below. Yet she has a sense of perceiving the 
features within the context of all the sub-features processed at P; or within a holistic context. 
 
I postulate that: 
i. for a subject to perceive the features extracted by a population P of neurons 
consciously, it is necessary that a reconstruction of the attractor of the dynamical 
system ĐP is made from the extracted features;  
ii. when such an attractor is reconstructed, the reconstruction which captures the 
evolutions of the features attended to, embedded in the evolutions of the sub-features 
processed at P, imparts the subjective feeling – there is something it is like to attend 
to the features in question. 
 
In other words, just the fact that there exists a population of neurons which extract the 
evolutions of certain features from the visual input does not give rise to conscious 
perception of those features. For conscious perception, it is necessary that the evolutions of 
the extracted features be represented as embedded in the evolution of a broader context. 
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3.3 Neural mechanism for conscious information processing 
 
The above discussion indicates that for a population P of neurons to instantiate a conscious 
mental representation the following is necessary. From its input, P extracts the features that 
give rise to the contents of the mental representation. In addition there exists a subset Π of 
neurons in P, which uses the information about the evolutions of the extracted features to 
reconstruct the attractor of the dynamical system ĐP. The output from P thus consists of two 
streams. The first stream consists of a set of spike trains which encodes the evolutions of the 
features extracted, and the second stream consists of another set of spike trains which 
captures the evolutions of the features extracted as embedded in the evolutions of the 
sub-features processed at P.  
 
It is the interaction between the two streams that is responsible for generating conscious 
mental representation. Let me explain. Once the first stream of spiking activities have 
continued long enough to enable the construction of the ISI vectors of appropriate 
dimension the reconstruction of the attractor starts. Thus the reconstruction of the attractor 
and the extraction of the feature evolutions proceed hand in hand the former following the 
latter evolutions with a time lag. A detailed explanation of this time lag is given in section 4 
below. As said before the reconstructed attractor captures the evolutions of all the degrees of 
freedom of the dynamical system ĐP and as one traces the trajectory of ĐP along the proxy 
attractor an appropriate projection traces the evolution of one or the other of the extracted 
features. Now it is possible to make any arbitrary projection, and an arbitrary projection 
would not necessarily correspond to the evolution of any of the extracted features. What 
informs the perceptual system to make the right projections? It is the first stream of output 
from P that carries the necessary information. Thus conscious perception is generated by the 
interaction of the two streams of output from P. The second stream which captures the 
evolution of all the degrees of freedom of the dynamical system ĐP provides the holistic 
context, while the first stream indicates the appropriate projections to be made so that the 
evolution of the extracted features are perceived as embedded in the evolutions of the sub-
features processed at P3. 
 
Thus a population P of neurons that instantiates a conscious mental state may not be 
confined to a single cortical area. There is nothing new in this statement, neuroscientists 
dealing with consciousness agree unanimously on this point [see for example Crick and 
Koch 2003, Rees 2004]. As far as vision is concerned, it is now a rather firmly established 
point of view that there are two distinct neural pathways for visual perception. From the 
primary visual cortex V1, a ventral stream projects to the inferior temporal cortex, and a 
dorsal stream, to the posterior parietal cortex. As Milner and Goodale point out [Milner and 
Goodale 1995, Goodale 2004], the ventral pathway is necessary for delivering our conscious 
precepts of the world surrounding us. In contrast, the processing carried out by the dorsal 
stream mediates the visual control of skilled actions. The visual information that is 
processed by the dorsal stream for the visuomotor control is never accessible to conscious 
scrutiny. In the least, therefore, P would be composed of two sub-populations one located in 
the ventral pathway and the other in the dorsal pathway. The sub-population in the dorsal 
                                                 
3 At this point one may advance an interpretation which goes as follows. The first stream of output from P 
instantiates a mental state and the second stream instantiates a higher order mental state that generates 
conscious awareness of the first mental state. Such a proposal would lead to higher-order theories of 
consciousness [see Carruthers 2001 for a review]. Most likely, it is possible to develop such a proposal 
consistently, nonetheless I do not see enough compelling reasons to do so at this point of development. 
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pathway would predominantly be responsible for extracting the features that give rise to the 
contents of the mental state. On the other hand the predominant function of the sub-
population in the ventral pathway would be to reconstruct the attractor of the dynamical 
system ĐP, in order to capture the evolutions of the extracted features as embedded in the 
evolutions of the sub-features processed at P. Of course, in order for the framework 
developed here to work, the sub-populations of P have to interact with each other to provide 
the unified sense of conscious perception, a point again supported by research in 
neuroscience. For example Rees [2004] writes "Reciprocal interaction between parietal and 
ventral visual cortex can serve to selectively integrate internal representations of visual 
events in the broader behavioural context in which they occur. Such network interactions 
may account for the richness of our conscious experience and may provide a fundamental 
neural substrate for visual consciousness". 
 
One point that is implicit in the above discussion and is worth pointing out explicitly is that 
the perceptual system does not have direct access to the attractor of dynamical system ĐP. 
Its access is via the reconstructed proxy attractor. Hence its interpretations of the evolutions 
of the extracted features as embedded in the evolutions of the sub-features processed at P, 
are determined by the characteristics of the proxy attractor. Another important point that 
needs mentioning is that reconstructing the attractor of a dynamical system by a population 
of neurons may become infeasible if the dynamical system has a large number of degrees of 
freedom. This is where sparse coding comes to the rescue. As one ascends up along the 
hierarchy, the neural code becomes increasingly sparse i.e., up the hierarchy fewer and 
fewer neurons get activated by a given stimulus. Thus the number of degrees of freedom of 
the dynamical system that represents the input to a level in the hierarchy decreases 
successively up along the hierarchy. At higher levels therefore ĐP becomes low dimensional 
making it feasible to reconstruct its attractor. Since constructing such an attractor is 
essentially what gives rise to the subjective feeling of phenomenal experience, it is 
inevitable according to the framework developed here that neural correlates of visual 
consciousness be found at higher levels of visual processing [Rees et. al. 2002]. 
 
 
3.4 Phenomenal vs. non-phenomenal representation 
 
With the insight gained from the above analysis it is now possible to answer the central 
question posed at the outset – what distinguishes phenomenal from non-phenomenal mental 
representations? For a mental representation (of a visual scene) to be phenomenally 
conscious, it is necessary that the contents of the representation capture the evolutions of the 
relevant features (of the visual scene) as embedded in the evolutions of the sub-features of 
which these features are composed of. If only the evolutions of the features are captured and 
not the embedding, then the mental representation remains unconscious. 
 
 
 
4. Libet's half-a-second delay in eliciting consciousness 
 
In a series of experiments that has been unique in neuroscience, Libet had the opportunity to 
study awake and responsive patients, whose somatosensory cortex was exposed for applying 
electrical stimuli for therapeutic purposes. From these experiments Libet concluded that, 
half-a-second continuous neural activity is required to elicit consciousness in a subject 
[Libet 2004, Chapter 2; Blackmore 2003, pp 57-60; see also Marchetti 2005]. I will 
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summarise here only those of Libet's findings that I want to deal with to provide empirical 
support for the theoretical framework developed in the previous sections. 
 
By stimulating the patient's somatosensory cortex with a train of electrical pulses Libet 
found that there is a minimum intensity for these pulses below which no sensation can be 
elicited. At the liminal intensity, the patients reported a feeling of sensation, coming from 
the related part of the skin, if the train of pulses continued for at least 500 milliseconds. In 
other words consciousness takes half-a-second to build up. Moreover this minimum 
requirement of a 500 milliseconds train of pulses to elicit conscious response was found to 
be independent of the frequency of the pulses. Libet also found that shorter train durations 
could elicit reportable sensation but for this the required intensity of the pulses would have 
to be very high and go into the ranges not often encountered in a person's normal everyday 
level of sensory experience. Libet therefore concluded that a 500 millisecond continuous 
neuronal activity is a minimum necessity, the neural adequacy, before a patient can report 
conscious sensation, and hence the observed half-a-second delay in eliciting consciousness. 
 
Would such a neural adequacy be required for a reportable sensation if the patients were 
stimulated at the skin instead? In other words if one touches a subject, would this touch have 
to generate continuous neural activity for 500 milliseconds in order for the touch to be felt. 
Libet found that to be the case. He stimulated the skin by applying a single pulse and 
followed it by giving stimulation to the cortex. When the cortical stimulus was applied 
between 200 and 500 milliseconds after the skin stimulus the skin stimulus was not felt or 
the cortical stimulation retroactively masked the skin stimulation. This way Libet indirectly 
showed that the skin stimulus would need to generate neural activities for at least 500 
milliseconds at the somatosensory cortex before it can be felt. Masking the skin stimulus 
before such a neural adequacy is reached will result in no reportable sensation.  
 
However half-a-second is comparatively a long interval of time in one's perceptual 
activities, how come one never notices this delay. In Libet's words [Libet 1999] "We solved 
this paradox with a hypothesis for 'backward referral' of subjective experience to the time of 
the first cortical response, the primary evoked potential. This was tested and confirmed 
experimentally [Libet et. al. 1979], a thrilling result". The primary evoked potentials occur 
after about 10-20 milliseconds after peripheral stimulation. According to Libet, the time of 
the occurrence of the primary evoked potential acts as an epoch to which a sensation of 
touch is subjectively referred back to once the neural adequacy for the touch has been 
achieved. Note that a primary evoked potential is not generated when a train of pulses is 
applied directly to the somatosensory cortex. Thus, in such a case, there does not exist an 
identifiable epoch to which the subjective experience can be referred back to. 
 
Let me now explain how the framework developed in Section 3 for conscious perception 
can neatly explain, the half-a-second delay in eliciting conscious awareness as well as the 
related backwards referral in time. Consider a somatosensory neuron which has been 
activated either by applying a pulse to the skin or by a train of electrical pulses applied 
directly to the cortex. As a result the neuron issues forth a train of spikes. In section 3.2, I 
postulated that for conscious perception of the stimulus it is necessary to reconstruct the 
attractor of the dynamical system representing the input to the neuron, and in section 3.1, I 
showed how this attractor can be reconstructed from the inter-spike intervals. To 
recapitulate briefly, let the time evolution of the input dynamical system be specified by the 
trajectory of its state point S(t) and let the trajectory be attracted to a d-dimensional attractor 
A in the state space k. Let the neuron start firing at the time t0, issuing a train of spikes at 
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firing times t0 < t1 < t2 < …, etc. From these firing times we can construct the inter-spike 
intervals τi = ti+1 – ti. Using the ISIs we construct a set of m-tuple ISI vectors 
{τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}, for i = 0, 1, 2 …, etc. All these vectors now define a topological space B 
in some m, and if m > 2d, then B is a reconstruction of A. The fact that B is a reconstruction 
of A is indicated by the fact that one can find a one-to-one mapping f : B → A which 
preserves the topology. 
 
Let us unravel this reconstruction of the attractor step by step. The first m-tuple ISI vector is 
{τ0, τ1, …, τm-1}. As τm-1 = tm – tm-1, this vector cannot be constructed until the spike at tm has 
appeared. Similarly the second ISI vector {τ1, …, τm} cannot be constructed until the spike 
at tm+1 has appeared and so on. In other words the first point of the manifold B will be 
established at time tm and the second point at time tm+1 and so on. Therefore the 
reconstruction of B, which is a proxy of the attractor A, does not start at time t0 but is 
delayed until time tm. Now according to the framework espoused here the reconstructed 
attractor B is necessary for conscious perception, hence the delay in eliciting conscious 
sensation in Libet's experiments. 
 
Again the reconstructed manifold B informs the nervous system about the input to the 
neuron under consideration. The nervous system does not have direct access to the attractor 
A of the dynamical system representing the input. It interprets each point in B to be a point 
in A and this correspondence is given by the one-to-one mapping f : B → A. How does this 
correspondence work? Consider the ith point in the construction of B which is the ISI vector 
{τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}. Now τi = ti+1 – ti and τi+m-1 = ti+m – ti+m-1. Hence the construction of the 
ith point in B depends upon the spiking times bounded by [ti, ti+m]; or equivalently it 
depends upon a series of measurements conducted by the neuron on the input dynamical 
system between times [ti, ti+m]. Hence the ith point {τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1} in B can be mapped 
onto either of the following points in A: either onto S(ti) or onto S(ti+m). In other words we 
have two one-to-one mappings  
f1 :  B → A where f1 ({τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}) = S(ti) for i = 0, 1, 2 …, or  
f2 :  B → A where f2 ({τi, τi+1, …, τi+m-1}) = S(ti+m) for i = 0, 1, 2 …. 
If the points in B are interpreted to be points in A through the mapping f1 then the first point 
in B which is established at time tm will correspond to the point S(t0) in A i.e. correspond to 
the state of the input dynamical system at time t0. This will give rise to a backward referral 
in time. If on the other hand, the interpretation takes place via the mapping f2, then the first 
point in B will correspond to the point S(tm) with no backward referral in time. The nervous 
system is able to take advantage of both these interpretation. When the input signal gives 
rise to a primary evoked potential, which would appear a time t0, the correspondence B → A 
is via f1, and in the absence of any primary evoked potential the correspondence is 
implemented through f2.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have exploited a few established facts in neuroscience to analyse aspects of 
information processing carried out by a population of neurons. Adopting knowledge from 
neuroscience as a basis, it has been possible to invoke the methods of non-linear analysis to 
understand the intrinsic nature of conscious information processing and thus get some sort 
of a grip over the elusive concept of phenomenal experience. The frame work proposed here 
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provides an example of how experimentally based hypotheses, generated through analytical 
methods, can in turn be validated using existing empirical results. Over the years, 
neuroscientists employing various imaging techniques, have uncovered a plethora of facts 
unravelling the peculiarities of the central nervous system. It is tempting to think that 
analytical methods developed in non-linear sciences and information theory etc., can be 
employed to take advantage of this vast store of knowledge to improve upon the suggested 
frame work. 
 
I wish to thank Jon Opie for his comments which clarified many points and improved the 
manuscript. 
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